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ABSTRACT
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When the ongoing reforms of banking in Nigeria commenced, there were
several arguments against the seeming harshness of the measures. As the

a;

revelations increased, the argument became the manner the revelations were

made. All these pointed to the capacity of humans fo resist change. lt was
generally accepted that things went terribly wrong and some drastrc sfeps
needed to be taken. The outcome of the greed-induced crisis was not peculiar
to Nigeria, as banks failed all around the world as their capital was eroded.
There are obvious /essons to be learned from these developments, perhaps
most important of all is that framework and institutional capacity for handling
financial crisis needed to be developed and systematically strengthened.
Key words: Crisis, Change, Greed, Behaviour, /ssues, Lessons
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During the period trom2004 to 2010,
N(pria wihessed two deep banking
reforms, each of them posing peculiar
challenges to both the regulators and

operators, but more to the latter in
complying with the stffi hurdles of new
minimum capitalization of N25 billion
and other requirements. The reforms
forced some fundamental changes in

Nigerian banking and indeed,

cfianged the face of Nigerian banking

furgpodThat first attempt at indepth reform in

2NM/2OO5 was designed to lift
N(prian banks to intemational repute
and reckoning, from a weak and
uncompetitive position internationally.

Pdor to that time, it was difficult for
N(prian banks to get a mention in
globalranking in the banking market,
sfiib it was also inconceivable that
they could handle mega transactions
that could leverage the economy in

the rapidly changing world. lt was
tashionable to compare the entire
indusfy of 89 banks in operation with
only a handtul of banks in South

Africa!

ft w:as also clear that the trajectory of

the banks was ominous anO

woutO

have dire @nseguences for both the

financial system and the national
economy if no action was taken. By
the end of 2004, as high as 23oh of

But change of the fundamental kind
that Nigerian banking witnessed in

aggregate banking industry loans and

especially since August 2009 will
naturally invite not mere resistance

advances were non-performing, and
this was very close to the threshold of
25o/o atwhich systemic distress would

the six-year period from 2004 to 2010,

but every effort to reverse it! lndeed, it

can be argued that the

latter

have to be declared.

(ongoing) reforms actually were

Now, there is the natural tendency for

in the reform of 200412005. ln orderto

informed by the implementation gaps

people to resrsf change, especially
where they have misgivings about the
necessity for change and/or about the
change driver. The latter can come
either in terms of the personality,
his/her credentials or where his/her
vision is foggy. Of course, there are
several other reasons why people
resist change. One of the eight
reasons identified by the lnternational
Labour Organization

in its study of

why people resist change is

the
argument that change will disrupt their
current habits and practices. For such

people, it does not matter whether
those practices are against the longterm interesf of the organization they
belong to, let alone the public good
that looks beyond obligations in law.

This in fact, is why change is so
difficult to drive and thus requires
some measure of diplomacy and

robust people/informition
management to successfully achieve
its objectives.

meet the new minimum capital

requirement, there was a plethora of

record-breaking mergers and
acquisitions in Nigerian banking the
number of banks that combined at
once (nine in one instance) was
unprecedented anywhere in the
world!

Ordinarily,

a

massive change that

would sweep away the jobs of about
65 bank chief executives and higher

numbers down the ranks should
attract some resistance. But the
radical policy shift enjoyed strong
political backing that provided the will

and resolve to change the face of
banking in Nigeria irreversibly.

Emerging from the earlier reform

were 25 supposedly strong and weil
capitalized banks, which reduced to

24 when two of them engaged in
further market-induced Sriinesi

in arry way ,epresent the oficial position
or rhinhing of the Central Bonk of Nigeia. 7he
author
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combination. lt must be noted, with a
deep sense of history that not all the
25 banks post-consolidation in early
2006 truly had unimpaired capital of
N25 billion and above! That really was

the beginning of the trouble

that
expanded and eventually exploded in
our faces when a credit and capital
audit (stress test) was conducted by
the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)
during the second half of 2009.

As such, the first reform created big
(not mega) banks, while the second
(ongoing) reform is an inevitable
follow-up to the earlier one that is to
say, the second is the unfinished
busrness of the first! What made the
second reform deeper and of greater
consequences (and necessity) was
the then festering global financial
crisis, to which there was yet no clear-

cut solution anywhere. What with the
first attempt by the G-7 (richest
countries), expanded to G-20 (richest
and emerging economies) and then
reduced to G-2 (USAand China)!
It is obvious that the problems that the

second reforms were initiated to solve
were not in any way peculiarto Nigeria
banks were in trouble everywhere
around the world. But the Nigerian
culture is always to seek extraindustry explanations for any action
aimed at industry cleansing or to align
the system with global best practices.

The recent banking reforms elicited
vehement citicism and generated a
cacophony of dubious analyses

.
.
.

The manner oI implementation
The seeming lack of coherence

in the unfolding

new

dimensionsto it.

The poor management of
information.

There was the general impression
then that the CBN was not much

interested in constructive

engagemenf. ln order to place all
these in proper perspective, it is
useful to revert to the place of banking
in the modern economy. The pivotal
role of the banking system in a
modern economy goes beyond

intermediation and includes

facilitating payments (domestic and
international), market-making, policy
implementation, providing agency
and guarantor services. A robust
financial system drives economic
growth and interconnects the
domestic economy with the rest of the
world, providing the transmission
mechanism for capital flows and
current account transactions. The
banking industry therefore, must
remain healthy and sound if the
national and sub-national economies

must thrive and maintain
macroeconomic stability.

banks be expected to play these
roles, in the context of the ongoing
reforms, certain key issues would

largely for two reasons. First was the

need to be dealt with. One of them is

the global view that requires that

what was universally accepted as the
right thing to do in the circumstance.
The second reason was the blind
pursuit of selfish (capitalist) interests
that has made those perceived as
losers in the outcome of the reform to

world.

to

make dubious

arguments against the agenda. Again,

those who know (by way of
experience and exposure) and were
supposed to stand up in defense of the
reforms were deafeningly silent!

But disappointingly,

a

number of

supporters of (he reforms soon shifted
position, in the course of time,
because of a number of reasons,
including:

Nigerian banking must become safer
and be a vibrant channel for attracting

new investments from around the
The historical fact is that banks have
failed primarily because of greed ot
the major actors (usually the directors
and management of banks). Banks
are still failing today (failed banks
were still being counted in the USAup
until the end of 2010) and banks will

continue to fail. -The failure
phenomenon in banking is episodic

because man is naturally greedy and
only comes to his senses temporarily
whenever he gets his fingers burnt!
Perhaps by the end of 2011, most
bankers (those lucky to still have
banking jobs after the global financial

crisis had abated) would
7

HOW BANKS BECAME TROUBLED
Up until the end of 2005, the banking

industry in Nigeria was fairly
a few banks
dominating the market. The
oligopolistic, with

mandatory consolidation created
several big banks that became even

hungrier for size! Often times, big
banks have proved to be ertremely
complex, which creates control
problems that either involves the top
executives or their so-called trusted
aides. The banks therefore, engage in
risky behaviour that ultimately gets
everybody into trouble.
Such banks become sysfemrcand are

labeled as 'too-big-to-fail', as their
failure can take down along many
other banks, or the failure can weaken

the entire system and require major
efforts to stabilize the system. ln the
circumstance, the banks might grow
so big as to become 'too-big-torescue'. ln that case, the resource
requirement for the rescue becomes a
major issue! Clearly, there were banks
in Nigeria that were too-biglo-fail, and

they were already showing signs of
weaknesses that made their failure

imminent. Oceanic Bank,

Since banks are the firstvictimsot any
financial crisis, they command such
attention and quick intervention if the
economic wheel must not be allowed
to grind to a halt. Should Nigeria

silence (which continued for some
time) of key stakeholders in Nigerian
banking who preferred to be silent
rather than speak up in defense of

continue daily

forgotten what led to the problem

of the reforms.

have

lntercontinental Bank, Union Bank

and Afribank were big and had all the

red flags of real stress! Of smaller
systemic risk were Finbank, Bank
PHB and Spring Bank.

Truly, Nigerian banks had become
bigger and more complex and their
trajectory (at that time) should worry
any watcher of the global financial
system and what was unfolding. That
would mean if the ongoing banking
reforms were not embarked upon at
that point in time, Nigeria possibly
would have /osf all the garns of an
evolving and sound banking system of
the preceding decades of unrelenting
efforts to build. ln fact, if nothing was
done, the gains of the 2OO412005
reforms would have been lost totally.

Without getting into further details, it is

useful to ask a few questions to
establish whether it was the nonexistence of strategy, poor strategy,
lack of implementation capacity, halfheafted implementation, or sheer
greed disguised as world-class
business strategy that caused the
crisis and informed the intervention
that the ongoing reforms represent.
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Any of these factors can easily explain

what happened. As such, the crisis
can be put down to a cocktail of the
above factors plus regulatory lapses,
or decision not to 'rock-the-boat' or
playing the ostrich whose head was
buried deep in the sand wishing away
the problem!
By half-year 2009, most of the banks

operating

in

Nigeria had been

weakened by the global financial
crlsrs and the CBN failed to admit that.
A number of the banks became weak

due to foggy strategy or their

management simply lacked the
capacity to implement the strategies
they had designed. The following
table shows the perception of the
heavily troubled banks that required
CBN intervention in AugusUOctober
2009. The vision and strategy of some

were quite clear, while others were
foggy. Capacity to implement the
strategy defined (where it existed)
ranged from weak/timid to average
and agile. The agile ones among them

were recognized in the banking
market as aggressive, and they
indeed took pride in their fast growth

rules without sanctircn'! The specra/
purpose vehicles (SPVs) discovered
in some of the troubled banks in
Nigeria (and even beyond) were legal
quite alright, but the motive was
against public good. Most of those
SPVs were outright fraudulent.
It is obvious that the ongoing reforms
in Nigerian banking weighs in more on
the side of too-bigto-fail than too-big-

corporate governance. Greed was the

major problem, along with

integrity/confi dence of stakeholders.

This finding for the USA is not
different than in Nigeria, and it is

There is no doubt that almost all the
troubled banks around the world had

possibly worse. Most of the banks in
Nigeria contravened the set codes of
corporate governance, and perhaps
the worst cases were those that
received the heaviest sanctions. lt is
always more effective to apply heavy
sanctions to law breakers, and the
sanctions should be commensurate
with the infractions. Othenruise, the
sanction could become an incentive
to breakthe lawwith impunity.

co rpo

rate gove

rn an

ce issues. As they

were in Nigeria, so they were in the
USA, Europe and many other
jurisdictions. This means that the

most sophisticated regulatory
framework is also vulnerable,
especially where operators and other
stakeholders pursue their own selfish
interest.

ln a

commentary on American

law imposed some big new
burdens on the board,

Ultimately, banking, like any human
endeavour, should be organized,
superuised and regulated in such
manner as to encourage (and
demand) right behaviour from those
entrusted with common wealth and
other people's assets. There is no
doubt that the Nigerian banking
system needed the kind of shock
therapy that the ongoing reforms
appearto be.

committee. So much so that

Whatthe CBN had done can easily be

"Sarbanes-Oxley was
supposed to improve

corporate

Board

lots of talk about how the new

especially the audit
some long-time directors
thought the job wasn't worth it
anymore. ln the wake of the

financial crisis--and some of
the accounting shenanigans

to light later-people started to wonder if the

that came

law really made nruch of a
difference."
ln a study of 20 big banks in the USA,

Table f : Perception of Troubled Banks

Oceanic

Intercontinental
Bank

--

CAPACITY

TYPOLOGY

Average

Clear
Clear
Clear

Agile
Agile

Eagle
Eagle

Fogry

Slim Down
Down
Circled Wason-

Agile
Timid
Weak

Eagle
8

placed within context of the advice to

the global leaders of G-20 at their
Spring meeting of 2009, whereby the
author Keiichiro (2009) drew from the
Japanese experience of difficulty with

resolution of the banking crisis of
1

997/1 998 and argued that:

"Bad debt is the root of the
crisis. Frscal stimulus may
help economies for a couple
of years but once the
"painkilling" effect wears off,
US and European economies

STRATEGY
Fogry

Fogg,,

gaps. More of banks' directors should

shareholders or core investors.

and maintain

the

seeming 'wide latitude to break the

but it was not complied with fully,
leaving supervisory and oversight

rescued banks in order to stabilize the

system

performance, and there was

countries) and
suspect strategy coupled with poor

ground for some eight to nine years!
This meant the law existed quite
alright to ensure effective oversight,

have financial background and be
truly independent of the dominant

circled wagon (clueless about how to
move on from its present position).

in 50

Yet, Sarbanes-Oxley had been on the

N620 billion was extended to the

banking, Jim Kim (Editor-in-Chief of
Fierce Finance) stated that:

operating

backgrounds pre-crisis, while just
nine chairmen were independent.

to-rescue. This explains why some

rate! Placing the banks in strategy
typologies completed the perception
in three planks of eagle (keen sight,
strength or speed), slim down (size
had become a drag and started
creating a problem of its own) and

There was no doubt that all these
banks had corporate governance
rssues at that time, and this was one
sure factorthat can compromise even
the best of strategies. Lehman
Brothers was a fantastic 1S8-year old
banking brand, but it collapsed
because of its extreme complexity
(2,985 legal entities under the belt,

Moodyr's found that about one-third

of outside directors had financial

will plunge back into crisis.
The crisis won't be over until
the nonpefforming assets are
off the balance sheets of US
and European banks,'

EMERGING ISSUES
Right from the day it was announced,
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the ongoing reforms were branded as

course, has not been assuaged bythe

the extent that those banks were nof
liquidated, the owners still remained
shareholders in those banks. What
has happened is that the value of their

seeming interference of the CBN in
the operations of the banks whose
executive directors were sacked and

significantly, and whenever new core
investors come in, the old investors

a 'hidden agenda', being

spearheaded by the CBN. This of

into which the apex bank injected
some N620 billion. Reference has
been made to the appointment of
advisers for the banks and several
other actions that suggest micromanaging of the troubled banks by the
CBN.

The impression of a hidden agenda
has not changed and will remain up
until the CBN exits those banks. To
disabuse the minds of unrelenting
critics, as well, the following issues
must be addressed as professionally
as possible.

CBN Exit from the Troubled Banks
This must be orderly and transparent.
Efforts in this regard till date are in the
direction of sale to other banks and/or
investors that are unrelated to the
former core investors. There are a few

issues in this. First is the usual
qualification of 'fit-and-properpersons', which hinges on two

important factors of proven technical
capability and clean fund to be
injected. No doubt, there have been
cases in the past in Nigerian banking

where troubled banks were sold to

entities that never met this
requirement, and ended up
compounding the cost of such failed
bank to the regulatory authorities and
the economy in general.

Second is the argument of the 'right-

of-first-ref

usal' to former

core

investors. This is especially important
in banking and there are antecedents

also in Nigerian banking.

Usually,
former core investors that caused a

bank's technical insolvency are
reluctant to inject fresh funds,
especially in cases of insider abuses
that brought the bank to that sorry
state. However, if they choose to inject
fresh funds into the bank, they get the
bank back, but subject to restrictions
in management involvement or other
such terms dictated by the regulatory
authorities.

Lost lnvestments
The foregoing brings in the argument
of whether the former owners had /ost
their money in the troubled banks. To

shareholding has diminished

will obviously become minority

shareholders. The valuation of the
weak bank being purchased will

Will the bonds then be issued

f.

There also is the issue of the
appointment of the management of
AMCON, which must be transparent
and based on merit relating to
competence and depth of experience
in financial banking mafters. This must

be devoid of politics and

ethnic

diminish significantly the market value
and offer price for the stock by new
investors.

sentiments. As obvious as this may
seem, it is an important issue if
cognizance is taken of a recent case of

Asset Management Gorporation of
Nigeria(AMGON)
An important element in these
reforms is the Asset Management
Corporation of Nigeria, which indeed
was listed as one of the 13 elements
of the 200412005 reforms but not
implemented. Now that AMCON has
come legally into existence, the real
issue revolves around its operational

graduated from the university only a

modalities.

a.

ln the proposed issuance of
bonds in exchange for discounted
non-performing risk assets (NPL), it is
assumed that not all NPL will qualify
for purchase by AMCON, possibly
when there is no underlying asset (i.e.
security) or the loan was dubious ab
initio. Willthe discount be fixed across

the board or depend on a set of
transparent parameters that are
verifiable?

b.

Next is whether the bonds will
be tradable and/or conveftible. lf they

are tradable, question is who buys
bonds now? lf the banks have been
the major buyers and traders in
bonds, where will such toxic riskasset based bonds (though
guaranteed by the Federal Ministry of
Finance) go in the market to the
banks or non-bank investing public?

c.

the appointment of someone

that

couple of years ago into office as
director in a Federal MDA, in an
institution where there are those with
technical competence and some 30
years cognate post-graduate work
experience holding deputy director
appointments!
I nform

atio n M a n agement

lnformation managemenf has been a
major area of challenge, relating to
what to say (especially the repeated
reference to particular individuals) and
how to say it. This is situated between
the utterances of the Governor of the
Central Bank, other top functionaries
of the apex bank and its Corporate
Communications Unit. An observation
of the advertorials of the'Renaissance
Professionals' showed that their major

reference was to seeming

contradictions in the statements made
by the CBN Governor during the

The yield, of course, must be

pretty attractive and significantly
above those of other bonds (private
and public) in the market in order for
the bonds to enjoy patronage.

d.

lf the bonds are convertible at
maturity, that can add to the attraction,

as any investor in them knows right
from inception of investment that 7
years down the road, it (or s/he) will
become a shareholder in the bank
concerned. The question will also
arise as to shareholder in which
bank?
9

r

e.

on bankspecific basis?

period August 2009 (when the
of the first set of banks
subjected to stress test was
outcome

announced) up until October 201 0.
Granted that views and opinions can
change as more facts are made
available or superior arguments are

accepted, such changes can be
pounced upon for dubious purposes in

matters as fundamental as the
ongoing reforms in Nigerian banking.

This is the more reason the top
functionaries of the apex bank
(starting from the Governor) must be
circumspect in their utterances. lt must
also be noted that in the tracking and
forecast of movements in interest and

exchange rates by market
participants, significant utterances of

key government functionaries is a key
factor!

State of the Nigeria Economy

The poor state of the

Nigerian
economy, as at mid-year 2010, was

July - September 2010
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remain deferred. At cunent rate, such
hope might begin to be realized only

inadvertently adduced to the banking
reforms, even though such argument
was hollow. ln the situation, Nigeria
was not different than other nations of

towards the end of the 4'n quarter of
2010.

the world that had been affected by
the global financial crisis and gone
into economic recession. ln some
countries, this was seen as more
political than an issue in the
management of the economy by the
apex bank financial regulatory

lncompetence

There was accusation of
incompetence at the top level of the
CBN, based on institutional
weakening and excessive attention to
risk management, while other key
functions of the CBN and modalities
were minified. Again, this could be tied
to most utterances that seem to
magnify risk management. There

authority.

to this is that the
Nigerian economy lags the advanced
and leading emerging economies,
and as such the effect of the recession
in the world economy impacted
Nigeria some 12 to 18 months after
Another angle

was, at that stage of the reform, no
clear indication that equal attention
was going into the four pillars of the
reform agenda (figure 1) and that this
is married to the traditional role of the
central bank vis-d-vis its policy tools.
ln particular, the Governor had been
reported to have downplayed the
importance of monetary pol icy tool s in
managing the fiduciary and economic
responsibilities of the CBN.

the crisis started taking its tolls on
those economies. Also, at the time the

crisis had started to,abate in other
jurisdictions, its heavy toll was just

settling into the Nigerian financial
system and economy.

Added to this is the fact that Nigeria
had no institutional arrangement to

Response to Gomments

deal with such financial crisis the
banks had never been this big and
never been so involved in
international transactions at such
levels.. What those economies
responded to promptlytook Nigeria all
of the period from November 2008

The prompt response of the CBN
Governor to every poser created the
impression of resrsfance to new ideas
and exploration of new perspectives
to issues. Unfortunately, this viewwas
held both within and outside the apex
bank itself. As an illustration, every

meeting of the Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC) always invites
speculations about the outcome,
especially on what the Committee

(when the effect of the crisis on capital

flows became worrisome as to make
the CBN devalue the Naira by 20o/o)

and August 2009 when 'new' CBN
acted! Until the banking crisis is
resolved convincingly, the hope for
sustainable economic recovery may

Figure

was likely to do to the monetary policy
rate (MPR). Any view expressed by
the CBN Governor would therefore,

l:

Enhrnce the

Establish Financial

Enable llealflry Finencial

Stebility

Sectr Evolution

framework reform

.Risk

based

sr.puvision
.Consrmer
protection

.Cmpoate
pvernarrce,
disclmure and

traNparency

.Finarcial stability
committee
.Macro pnrdentral
issres
.Capital market
development (as
altemative b bak

.Competitive banking
ind:stry stuctrre
.Improve d c ost stucture of
banks through cost

.Reliable ,'xl secure

tudiry)
.

was the signal to market watchers,
and would remain so as long as the
CBN Governor will grant interviews
and volunteer opinions just prior to
any meeting of the MPC. To the
external stakeholders of the apex
bank, they will ignore the structure
and institutional arrangements for
managing the economy and only
seek to obtain the CBN Governor's
opinion!
END NOTES

Clearly,

a

number

of

engaging

emerging issues have been raised in
this paper, although inconclusive, as
there are a few others still that were
not mentioned. This notwithstanding,
there is no doubt that the ongoing

reforms are imperative

payment Etstems

Counbr-cyclical

.

fiscal polbies

'Improviug firuncjal

Greabr ftrarcial irclusion

inftatuctrrc:

credit
bureaus and registrars

a

More important for Nigerian banking
is for the regulators, operators and
other banking system stakeholders to
learn the right lessons from allthese
developments.

The first major lesson is the
inevitability of the business cycle,
which means that boom will
necessarily be followed by recession

Ensrre the Finencid
Sector Codributes to
the Real Economy
.

Improvin g effectivenes s
f existing development
finance institrtions
o

.

Examination of critical

fm ecsromic
develqmcd (e.g. porrer,
issues

pct,railwap)

. leveraging m cbn's role
as an adviser to the

gor/€rrrDent

o

eccnmric

mattsrs

.GrsrtrcrBtgcmcnt ryth

tbHif,g.iHlsry

10

for

floundering Nigerian banking system,
where the major players continued to
play to the gallery. The troubled banks
were truly troubled and they had a lot
of poor corporate governance issues.
Any banking system regulator that is
focused tightly on his/her mandate
would not have done differently.

ontrol

and hrsinessprocess
outsorucing

the

and thus undermine the meeting. This

Hllors of lhe Bcnkhg Sec'tor lefiotnr

Qmlity ofBanks
.Regulatoy

be considered a preview of

outcome of any impending meeting,
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and possibly slump before recovery.
As such, lending by banks should be
done cautiously during a boom era,
observing all the rules of risk
management so that they can

would not have deteriorated to the
level discovered and announced on

minimize losses when things go really

thought to what the Americans did in
setting up a'Financial Crisis lnquiry
Commission', as part of the efforts to
develop an enduring institutional
arrangementto dealwith such crisis in

bad.

The second lesson is that for those

that engage in inappropriate
behaviour, a day will come when

someone will call those actions to
question. The price to be paid might
just be too high, but unfortunately
could affect adversely so many other
stakeholders, a number of whom
might not recover from the losses
inflicted by the irresponsible acts of a
few privileged individuals who largely

14'nAugust 2009.

It might also be

useful

to give a

stabilizing.
The proper setting up and operation of
AMCON will be a major factor in the
overall success of this crusade for

safer banks

in Nigeria. This also

1930) were made in July 2010 in the

USA

to ensure they are not exploited.

lessons Nigeria can learn from this.

The CBN should engage operators
more in dialogue and ensure that its
policy initiatives are inclusive rather
than creating the impression that the
ideas are lacking here or that

in the aftermath of their
investigations. Certainly, there are
lnformation management by the

central bank also needs

without consideration of the

Thirdly is that it should never again be
assumed that banks are 'insulated'
from the effects of financial crisis,
especially when there is a problem of
global dimensions like that of the
2007-2010 crisis. To think differently is
foolhardy in an environment where
banks are daily becoming more active
internationally. lf the actions taken
since August 2009 had commenced
earlier (say in March 2008 when the
impact of the crisis was first noticed in
the stock market), the banks probably

should give more attention to,
especially now that the system is

means where there are gaps in the
enabling law and modus operandi of
the corporation, care would be taken

future. Fundamental changes in
banking rules (unparalleled since

improvement, as utterances made

own and/orrun the banks.

depth of financial crisis experienced.
This is an area that the apex bank

interpretation the banking

stakeholders would put to them could

turn out counterproductive

by

exposing the apex bank to criticism,

misinterpretation

and

misrepresentation.

The delayed impact of the banking
reforms on the economy of course,
can be attributed to the lack of
institutional structures and
arrangements for dealing with the

everyone around is a rogue.
Now, if the banks are safe because the
operators are of right behaviour, then
the stakeholders will deal confidently,
and make the right decisions that will
augur well for both the banking
industry and the national economy. ln
that situation, banks will be able to play
effectively their developmental roles
and therefore attracUconduct new
investments from within the domestic
marketand offshore.
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